South Asia Under the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons

South Asia Under the Shad ow of Nuclear Weapons

Vi pin N arang

MIT D e partm e nt of Poli tic al Sci e nce IAP 22 January 2015

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The P uzzle

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Outline

• Basics of Deterrence Theory

• Basics of Nucle ar Weapons

• The N ucle ar ization of South Asia

• The Con seque nces o f Nucl eariz ation in South Asia

• How L ong can this Pr ecarious Balance of T erro r Last?

Deterrence Theory

• Deterren ce: Pres erva tion of the status quo by threa teni ng unac ce ptab le cos ts to a n opp one nt if they do X.

• Two Typ es of Deterren ce

– Deterr ence by Punishment

– Deterr ence by Denial

Deterrence Theory

• Three requirements (a ka the Three C’s):

– Capability

– Cred ibil ity

– Comm unication

Nuclear Weapons & Deterrence

• Nuclea r we apon s fundamenta lly differen t?

– Explosiv e yiel ds

– Missi le age

– Psycholog ical impact

Nuclear Weapons

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Basics of Nuclear Weapons

• Fissi on weapons (5- 40kT)

– U - 235 (e nriche d uranium)

– Pu - 239 (plut onium fr om reprocessing)

• Booste d Fis sion weapons (~ 20 0k T)

– Fis sion we apon plus Tr itium/De ute riu m gas (or Li - D)

• Fusi on we apons (Meg aton yie lds)

– Fis sion primar y t o ign ite a fusion sec ondary (D - T)

Operationa lizi ng Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear Posture

• How many and what type?

• How to del ive r them?

– Aircraft

– Ballistic Missiles (Land base d & Sea - base d)

– Crui se Missiles

• How to manage them?

Operationa lizi ng Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear Posture

• Deterring what?

– Deter nuc lear use and coerci on? Assured Retaliati on

• Mostly de te rr enc e by punishme nt

– Deter conventional aggression? First-use

• Can be det errence by punishment or denial

The N uclearizatio n of South Asia

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India throug h 1974

• India’s Security Envi ron ment

– 1962 War

– Chinese nucle ar te sts

– Persi ste nt w ars with P akistan, despit e conventional supe rior ity

• India’s Civi li an Nuclear Progra m

– CAN DU 40 M W reac tor 195 4

– Reproce ssing facility 1964

India throug h 1974

• Pea cef ul Nuclea r Explos ion 1974

– General sec urity envi ronment

– Dom estic politi cal explanation

– Power o f sc ienti fic bureaucra cy

• Nuclea r h edging

Paki stan 1971 - 1980s

• Pakistan’s Security Envi ron ment

– Impa ct of 1971 War

– “We will eat gr ass or l eave s, or eve n go hung ry. But we w ill get [ a Bomb] of our own” (Bhut to 1 965)

– January 1972, Bh utt o aut horize s nuc lea r we apons progr am

• Pakistan’s Nuclear Progra m

– Yes w e Khan (URENCO)

– Ur anium e nrichment : The ‘goat she d’ at Kahuta

– U. S. role in A fg hanista n

Pakistan Late -1980s

• Slow March to Nucleariza tion

– 1983 Chine se assista nce (CH IC - 4 design; 50kg HEU?)

– 1986 : US convince d Paki stan is nuc lear - cap able but perhaps not nuc lear - we apons stat e (‘two screw driv er turns’ awa y)

– March 1987: Zia c laims Pakist an ha s ca pability to ma ke a

bomb

– 1988 : Congr essm an Solarz quips Paki stan h as a ‘Sat urday nig ht spe cial’ ca pability: ambiguous but effect ive

India 1974 - 1989

• Dormancy : 197 4- 1989

• Covert Weap oniza tion: 1988 - 1989

– Ra ji v G and hi brings pro gram out of do rm ancy

– Weapons d esig ns, miniaturiza tion, prod ucti on capa bili ty developed

– Deliv ery capa bili ties developed/ tested

India 1990s

• March to Overt W eap oniza tion

– December 1 99 5: Rao (INC) on brink of tes t

– Mar ch 199 6: BJP a bor ts test

– May 199 8: BJP r eturns to offi ce, te sts 5 fissi on devices at Pokhran

• Several plausible explanat ions (se curity , dome stic pol itics, stat us)

India 1998 -present

• India’s Nuclear Posture: Assured Retaliation

– Civilian cus tod y of nuc lea r we apons

• DAE

• DRDO

• SFC

– De te rr ing nucle ar use against Indian citie s: Det errence by Puni shme nt

– No Fir st Use

Paki stan 1998 -present

• Steady ex pans ion

– Uranium Enrichment

– Plu tonium pro duction and repr ocessing goes online

– Deliv ery capa bili ties bought from China an d Nor th Korea (M -11, M-18, No -Dong)

• Overt Nucl eariz ation

– Indian tests l eft Pakistan wi th no option in May 1998

Paki stan 1998 -present

• Pakistan’s Nuclear Posture: First Use

– Mili ta ry c ust ody of nuc lea r we apons

– Asy mme tric esc alat ion of conflict to det er Indian conve ntional powe r: De te rr enc e by D enial

– De velopme nt of ‘batt lefield’ nuclear we apons: NASR, Ra’ad, Babur

Co nsequences of N uclearization: Phase I (Cove rt Nuclear Period 1986 - 1998)

• Conventional Wisdom: MAD is stab il izing

– He fty As sump tions

• South Asia different from Cold War

• Effect on Crisis Outbrea k

– Paki stan s lig htly em boldene d to support proxy for ce s

– India undete rr ed and has preventive war incent ives

• Tw o Mil itarized Crises in this p eriod

– Brasstac ks 19 86 - 1987

– Kashmir Compound Crisi s 199 0

Co nsequen ces of Nucle arization: Ph ase II (Overt Nucle ar Period 1998 - 2009)

• Eff ec t on Crisi s Outbrea k

– Pakistan mor e agg ressivel y emboldened

• Revisionist intent ions able t o pursued with higher fr equ enc y a nd inte nsity at bot h c onven tiona l and sub - conve ntional levels

– India sig nifi cantly deterred from conventional retaliation

Kargil 1999

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Kargil 1999

• Ind ia deterred from retali ating?

– Expected BJP response: ag gressi ve

– Actual BJ P r esponse: muted

• Constrained IAF and Army fr om c rossi ng LoC and IB

• Costly curta ilin g of military opt ions for fear of trig geri ng Paki stani nuc lear use

Operation Parakram 2001- 2002

D e c 13 , 20 01 : P aki s tani- bac k e d

P ar l i ament attac k

J an uar y 20 02 : BJP c ont e m plate s

l i m i ted w ar

Ma y 14 , 20 02 : P aki s tani- bac k e d

K al uc hak mas sacr e

J une 20 02 : BJP pre pare s for l arg e -

s c al e c on v e ntional w ar

J une 20 02 : P aki s tan expl i c i tly

thre ate ns n uc l e ar use

October 20 02 : BJP d e m obil i zes

Ba s e d o n : VK Soo d a n d P r a vin Sa w h n e y , Operat io n Para kr a m:T h e W a r U n fin ished, 2003 .

Operatio n Parakram 2001 - 2002

• Most li kely cas e for an aggress ive BJP resp onse

• BJP balk s in J une 2002 . Why ?

• Powe r of Pak ista n’s first use posture

Mumbai 2008

• Lashkar att acks on Mumbai, 2 6 Novem ber 2008

• Congr ess refrains from conve ntional reta liation

• For me r CoA S: Paki stan’s posture det erred Indian r et aliation

• “But whe n the dust set tl ed, all [the principals] a gr ee d tha t the un predicta bility on the Paki stan side an d the fear that its d ec isio n make rs coul d opt for a dispr oportion at e re sponse , incl udin g the nu cle ar option , sty mied any possib le cha nce of military act ion on India’ s beha lf afte r 26 / 11 . ” — Indian Expre ss , 26 Novem ber 2010

Summary for Phas e II

• Effe ct on Crisis Outbreak

– More frequent and intens e c rises trigg ered by Pakistan

– Embo ldened by shiel d of fi rst use nuclear posture

• Effe ct on Crisis Stab ility

– Crises ca pped now because Ind ian ful l -scale conve ntional retaliatory options are of f t he table

How Long Can this Last?

• Indian frustra tion: Traded conventi ona l superiority for Paki stani subconventi onal aggress ion

– Revisions at c onvent ional level: “Cold S tart ”?

– Conseque nce s of this shif t?

• What effe ct wi ll Cold St ar t have on Pakistan’s conventional and

nuclear po stur es?

• Indian r esponse to de te r battle field nuclea r w ea pon s

• Pakistani use of ‘proxy forces’ as stra tegi c poli cy

• Da ngerous ar ms ra ce + Fuse for crises und er quasi - sovereig n contro l (e.g. LeT ) = A region on the brink

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